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Introduction
1 The economic package proclaimed in Turkey on 24 January 1980 and the ensuing military
coup, which made possible the implementation of the package by bulldozing the existing
social and political configuration of the country, restructured the Turkish regime and the
state  apparatus  throughout  the  following  decades.  Presently,  it  is  a  well  established
tendency to trace the demise of class-based popular opposition back to the 1980 coup
d’État. From a comparative perspective Turkey is not unique in witnessing the rise of the
free-economy/strong-state type of politics known as neo-conservatism to the detriment
of populist regimes based on protectionist economic policies and national developmental
goals. The regimes of the Southern Cone in Latin America that survived coups in the early
seventies  had  more  or  less  comparable  experiences  (Schamis  1991).  However,  such
developments  were  not  limited  to  fragile  democracies.  For  instance,  in  the  United
Kingdom a thorough transformation was also realized, though through a different form
of authoritarianism (Jessop et al. 1984). In these more entrenched democracies, where
labor unions were far more powerful, governments preferred more vigilant policing of
social protest to outright military interventions.
2 These  global  developments  are  related  to  the  politics  of  creating  or  restructuring
markets.  Such  political  and  social  transformations  are  largely  results  of  deliberate
political  acts,  as  illustrated  by  the  literature  on the  social  embeddedness  of  market
structures  (Granovetter  1985).  Neo-conservative  governments,  whether  they  were
outright  military  regimes  like  the  one  in  Chile  or  respected  and  well-established
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polyarchies  such  as  Thatcherite  Great  Britain,  can  be  analyzed  as  different  cases  of
restructuring society at large according to the needs of a changing accumulation regime
and corresponding mode of articulation to the global economy. The politics of market-
making usually refers to institution-building through politics. However, it also involves
destroying existing institutions by whatever means necessary in order to clear space for
new ones.  In  most  the  Third  World  settings,  this  means  deliberately  destroying  the
populist vestiges of the old regimes and some aspects of participatory democracy.
3 With its neoliberal emphasis on replacing the entrenched developmentalist and populist
mode of  operation in state  economic enterprises  with market  rationality  and profit-
maximizing behavior, the Özal administration of the 1980s targeted the moral economy of
the public enterprise workers, and hence the very foundation of the Turkish organized
labor movement.  Such policies are not unique to Turkey; indeed they were the basic
tenets  of  structural  adjustment  programs  that  international  financial  organizations
promoted in indebted third-world countries. In many countries protest movements with
differing motives and actors developed in opposition to these measures and attained
varying results. In the Turkish case the main actor was organized labor, and the main
target  was  what  it  perceived  as  an  assault  on  the  moral  economy of  the  unionized
workers.  However,  the lively protest movement that contributed to the defeat of the
Motherland Party [Anavatan Partisi (ANAP)] at the polls in the 1989 municipal elections
and in the general elections two years later is often overlooked. This paper intends to
shed light on this cycle of protest by first exposing the basic tenets of Turkish labor
unionism,  then  exploring  the  moral  economy  argument,  and  lastly  describing  the
development of the cycle of protest spanning from the end of 1986 to the final days of
1991.
 
I. Labor unions in Turkey
4 From  1908  onwards,  political  opportunity  structures  stimulated  unionization  efforts
among Turkish workers. This is one of the defining traits of the Turkish organized labor
movement; workplace activists have always tried to benefit from opportune situations
and established local hubs of activity at the grassroots level. The first wave of strikes, for
instance, took place immediately after the reinstitution of the constitutional rights of
Ottoman citizens in 1908, and the first labor unions were established immediately after
the removal of the ban on class-based societies in 1946. These developments confirm the
claims  of  the  “political  process”  approach  to  social  movements,  which  argues  that
favorable political opportunity structures, such as a political cleavage among traditional
elites that weakens the political pressure on subordinated sectors of society, contribute to
the initiation of the social movements and protests (Tarrow et al. 2006: 45-68). 
5 Turkish  labor  historians  are  inclined  to  search  for  historical  precedents.  Whenever
confronted with an innovative protest action they look for earlier instances of strikes or
unionization activities. However, unless it is assumed that working classes are submissive
by definition, there in no reason to be surprised by spontaneous protest movements.
Whenever proper conditions are met, people tend to act collectively to ameliorate their
social,  economic  and  political  position,  using  tried-and-true routines  or  importing
routines from different  domains of  social  experience.  All  in all,  laborers  both in the
Ottoman and republican eras resisted the transformation brought by capitalist relations
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of production, either by relying on their already existing tool kit of protest or by adapting
parts of it to the new situation. 
6 Governments often try to balance their developmental needs with attempts to control the
industrialization process and delimit its consequences. Turkish governments, both in the
one-party and multi-party era, are no exceptions. As illustrated by the Labor Code of
1936,  Ankara  was  always  reluctant  to  recognize  the  collective  rights  of  workers,
preferring instead to bestow individual protection through legislation. But the existence
of such legal measures does not guarantee their application, and most of the time the
workers have had to struggle against their managers or local government officials to
secure their implementation.  They have also at times demanded that mechanisms be
established to guarantee their future execution to the collective benefit of workers. This
struggle constitutes the backbone of unionization activity in Turkey. Organized labor has
always found supporters in Ankara, making lobbying in Ankara or having a connection to
the establishment parties a valuable tool in labor struggles, particularly for workers in
the public sector. 
7 For workers in the private sector,  the process took a different shape. Ankara and its
political  class were always unwilling to enforce the stipulations of the Labor Code in
private businesses.  It  did not possess the necessary means, especially considering the
prevalence of small entrepreneurs. The Kemalist one-party government (1925-1945), the
direct heir of  the Unionist  cadres and policies,  aimed to encourage the accumulative
enterprises  of  its  Muslim  citizens,  and  was  therefore  always  complicit  in  the
transgressions of the Labor Code by the private businesses. Nevertheless, since the bulk of
the large industrial establishments were owned by the state, public enterprises did set a
minimum standard of conduct for private businesses. The public sector thus became the
primary means through which the Kemalist government implemented its social policy, a
practice which the Democratic Party inherited virtually unchanged in 1950.
8 Turkish  workers  were  not  unfamiliar  with  grassroots  organization.  The economic
hardships of World War II encouraged them to take initiative. Thus, when unionization
was allowed after the war many labor unions were established locally, primarily in the
public sector. Many of the influential labor unions of today began as the initiatives of a
handful of worker-activists, in few instances encouraged by the local party bosses of the
major  parties.  Whatever  their  origins  were,  they  developed  at  later  stages  in  close
cooperation with state authorities. After multi-party politics became consolidated, local
union bosses and party notables established webs of patronage around labor union locals.
9 The historical disposition of Turkish organized labor made the public enterprises the
primary locus of labor union activity. Indeed, minor villages that existed around these
establishments  often  turned  into  mid-sized  cities  because  of  the  employment
opportunities they created. Moreover, the employees of these establishments constituted
the backbone of the membership of the Turkish labor unions. The most important aspect
of their existence, though, was the standard they created for the regime’s relations to
industry. Legislation concerning working conditions, safety measures, social insurances
and wages were mainly implemented in public enterprises, which constituted the bulk of
the Turkish industry  up until  the  1980s.  The mere presence of  these  establishments
prevented the deterioration of working and living conditions in the private sector as well.
First, as already noted, organized labor in the public sector provided manpower and a
financial basis for the labor unions to operate in private businesses, albeit with differing
success. Second, the work environment and safety measures established for the public
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sector workers set a legal standard that could not simply be violated in the private sector.
Last  but  not  least,  public  sector  unions  connected  politicians  in  Ankara  to  labor
organizations throughout the country, since public enterprises existed in many Anatolian
cities and these workers could potentially influence the polls.
10 The transformation that entered the political agenda in the aftermath of the coup d’état
in 1980 threatened the raison d’être of public enterprises as economic institutions with
developmental rather than profit-maximizing objectives. The crisis of import substitution
made the balance of payments problems insurmountable; thus the problems related to
budgetary deficits worsened. When international financial institutions imposed austerity
measures on the borrowing countries, the public sector could no longer produce losses
for the sake of promoting economic and social development. In this respect, the moral
economy argument is useful to describe the seriousness of the change in the industrial
relations regime in terms of the total destruction of the populist discourse, if not the
actual practices of the regime. The moral economy argument also helps to explain the
resistance such changes triggered, a resistance which took the form of direct worker
action.
 
II. The Moral Economy Argument
11 The concept of the moral economy was introduced by E. P. Thompson in order to account
for English and Welsh food riots that took place during the middle and late 18th century,
when the market relations began to permeate provisioning patterns in the countryside
(Thompson  1971).  Thompson  argued  that  the  food  riots  were  not  the  result  of  an
instinctive impulse – hunger – but rather a legitimate reaction against a new political
economy that was not yet perceived as rational and legitimate. James C. Scott, on the
other hand, used the term to denote the seemingly non-rational behaviors of Southeast
Asian peasants, who constructed the productive relations of their villages around the
conception of the right to subsistence of every member of that peasant community (Scott
1979). Scott’s study is mainly a debate with the rational choice perspective. 
12 The moral economy argument is based on the assumption that economics is shaped by
the wider social  relations that surround the relations of  production and distribution.
Therefore,  before the construction of the “natural” order of a specific domain of the
production relations, there exists another order, which is conceived as natural by a broad
segment in any polity. “This in its turn was grounded upon a consistent traditional view
of  social  norms and obligations,  of  the proper  economic functions  of  several  parties
within  the  community,  which,  taken  together,  can  be  said  to  constitute  the  moral
economy of the poor” (Thompson 1971: 79).
13 Before Thompson popularized the moral economy argument, the main thread for this line
of argumentation came from the seminal work by Karl Polanyi (1986), who introduced the
concept  of  the  embeddedness of  economic  institutions.  Polanyi  differentiates  between
modern capitalist economies, which are based on the assumption of the self-regulating
market,  and traditional  economies,  where production and exchange relationships are
embedded in far more comprehensive social and political rules and practices. Polanyi
points to the abnormal and manmade nature of the idea of a self-regulating market, and
warns about and illustrates the social and economic risks of such institutions. On the
basis of these remarks and following in the footsteps of James C. Scott, the term ‘moral
economy’ has become a slogan for the critique of the market economy. 
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14 Following Scott, a research agenda emerged where every instance of rebellion against the
imposition of the modern economic structures and commercial markets onto traditional
polities, especially peasant revolts with a non-capitalist ideological discourse, began to be
analyzed  in  terms  of  a  sharp  dichotomy  between  moral  economies  and  commercial
economies. This research program assumes a rift between the so-called self-regulating,
autonomous  market  that  permeates  all  human  relations,  a  process  called
commodification, and the traditional economies shaped by unchanging social moralities.
The moral economy, in this view, belongs to the latter sphere, and is considered a feature
of  traditional  societies.  The  mainstream  scholarly  debate  thus  disregards  the
conceptualization by Thompson, and focused on morality of market mechanisms and the
merit of the assumptions of economic rationality.
15 Obviously,  the moral economy terminology is vulnerable to misuse due to the highly
normative connotation of the term. Those who use the term as the antithesis of  the
‘market economy’ in general ignore the capacity of capitalism to preserve non-market
social relations as an auxiliary in order to extend its reach over distinct domains of social
relationship;  consequently,  they disregard the cases  where resistance against  further
commodification  occurs  in  an  already  capitalist  society.  Latin  America,  where  the
superimposition of  commercial  agriculture over the latifundia holdings did not make
wage labor into the norm, is a case in point. The moral economy argument is not only
relevant for a traditional form of social relationship; it also entails a specific form of
social practice and regulation existing within the capitalist social form, a practice that is
distinct from and even opposed to the prevailing market mentality based on a newly
institutionalized set of norms and practices. When this latter tries to extend itself onto
the “moral economy,” in line with the pervasive nature of market structures, the social
group victimized by this transformation may resist, even violently, to preserve its pattern
of survival.
16 Thompson used the concept of moral economy to denote the substitution of the existing
patriarchal mentality in rural food provisioning practices in Britain and Wales by market
relationships. However, he acknowledged the applicability of this term to other fields of
study, albeit with extreme caution regarding the transfer of certain concepts to different
historical  contexts.  Indeed,  Thompson himself  cites  the  great  miner’s  strike  of  1985
against the Thatcher government as one of the last confrontations between the market
economy and the moral economy of British workers (Thompson 2006: 424-208). Unlike
anthropologically oriented scholars, Thompson does not compare two modes of social
relations  of  production,  one  traditional  and  one  modern,  but  rather  underlines  the
possibility that a historically rooted popular consensus on legitimate practices is capable
of inspiring resistance when breached by imposed “modern” norms of economic activity.
Thus,  he  is  not  arguing  that  market  mechanisms  are  immoral,  but  that  when  first
introduced they lacked a socially accepted legitimacy. Over time, however, the old moral
economy loses its hold over the populace and the rationale of the new political economy
takes root.
17 This is what Thompson conceives as the moral economy, and that is why he cautions
against the abuse of the term. It is not difficult to see the relevance of this analysis for
understanding  every  instance  where  established  local  patterns  of  subsistence  were
threatened by the globalizing system of trade and investment (Calabrese 2005: 309). Other
scholars also point in the same direction. For instance, Thomas Clay Arnold points to the
cases where the communal ethic of certain social groups or local communities within
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commercial  societies can be an effective base from which to resist prevailing market
mechanisms. His example comes from Ovens Valley, California, where the residents were
involved in acts of sabotage over rights to ground water. According to him, “The grounds
for politically significant moral indignation do not lie only or even predominantly at the
level of clashing economies or cultures,” but rather “at the intersection of the nested sets
of meaning and value called into question by equally specific changes in circumstances”
(Arnold 2001: 85). Similar observations were made by a follower of Scott. In a recent study
of Vietnamese peasants, Pamela McElwee found a continued resilience of subsistence-
oriented attitudes among the village communities in the region where Scott conducted
his original research in the 70s (McElwee 2007). This was the case even though agriculture
in Vietnam is presently largely commercialized due to successful transformations aimed
at the introduction of market institutions.
18 These cases demonstrate that the moral economy concept is not necessarily useful if the
concept  is  conceived  of  merely  as  a  moral  critique  directed  against  modern market
mechanisms from the vantage point of more traditional values. However, the concept
becomes more useful when used to account for reactions against the elimination of a
mode of subsistence that is considered vital to the maintenance of social ties. According
to Arnold,  “Moral  economy is  embedded in concrete ongoing social  relations,  not  in
generalized,  mechanical  moralities or romanticized pasts” (Arnold 2001:  94).  A moral
economy embodies  the main rationale  of  subsistence of  a  given polity,  and hence is
deeply interwoven in culture, so that any threat against it is also threat to the survival of
the polity. In such circumstances people tend to organize themselves in order to defend
the very basis of the social reproduction of their polities.
19 This paper argues that the experience of the British miners who resisted the conservative
government of Margaret Thatcher to which Thompson refers is roughly comparable to
the Turkish workers’ mass actions that took place during the late 1980s. Both involved
organized resistance by the lower classes demanding that crucial elements of the old
arrangement be safeguarded in the face of a thorough transformation of the system that
determined their economic and political lot in the regime. 
20 The  moral  economy  argument  demonstrates  that  efforts  to  preserve  the  traditional
paternalist relationships that provided a safety net for the underprivileged sectors of
society during an earlier era are untenable in the face of the structural transformations
required by capitalist relations of production. Thompson mentions this point, and Ayşe
Buğra  made  the  argument  plain  in  referring  to  Karl  Polanyi’s  analysis  of  the
Speenhamland system (Buğra 2001: 53).1 Similar analyses have been made in different but
comparable  contexts.  For  instance,  Marsha  Pripstein  Posusney  argues  that  a  moral
economy approach is the best possible analytical tool if one wants to make sense of labor
unrest  in Egypt (Posusney 1993).  She asserts  that  Egyptian workers have resorted to
collective  action  when  what  they  perceive  as  their  entitlements  in  the  Nasserist
developmental  state  have  been  violated  by  the  government  or  private  employers.
Although attempting to explain every strike wave or similar unrest by the same rationale
is  dubious  to  say  the  least,  she  is  undoubtedly  right  in  pointing  to  patron-client
relationships between workers and state-builders in the Third World as a factor which
contributes to labor activity.
21 Posusney makes another valuable argument on the disposition of the laborers’ unrest
when triggered because of a perceived violation of the moral economy of the industrial
relations. In such circumstances, Posusney asserts, workers’ collective action is almost
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always  “restorative”  in  nature.  Rather  than  demanding  a  shift  in  the  established
mechanisms  of  industrial  relations,  the  labor  movement  is  inclined  to  maintain  the
recognized  patterns  of  interaction  between  private  employers,  government  and  the
workers. That is why this type of collective action tends to have limited impact in the
long run.  One must nevertheless refrain from overgeneralizing specific  patterns,  and
remember that  unless  the historical  path of  development  of  organized labor  and its
relationship with the state and employers are taken into account, the analysis would turn
the moral economy argument into a buzzword describing every instance of collective
action by third-world workers.
22 If it emerges, the restorative collective action pattern can be the consequence of a special
kind of relationship between the state and organized labor. In late-developing nations
such as Egypt and Turkey, developmentalist aims coupled with a patrimonial political
culture may create a particular kind of industrial relations regime where the state, the
biggest  employer,  establishes a  bond to the workers under its  payroll  that  can have
repercussions for the whole of the working class. In such circumstances organized labor
has a stake in maintaining the state-sponsored regime of industrial relations against the
uncertainties of a possible thorough transformation. To this end, strategies of resistance
may first take the shape of a search for dialogue; if this fails, more direct means may
enter the scene. This was the pattern followed in Turkey when civilian rule was restored
after the 1980 military intervention, which completely overhauled the legal framework of
industrial relations by restricting the right to strike, closing down the radical wing of the
Turkish trade unions and erecting legal barriers against unionization activities.
 
III. The 1987 Strike Wave and its Aftermath2
23 The Türk-İş confederation, the only remaining representative of Turkish organized labor
after the 1980 coup, collaborated with the military administration, expecting to benefit
from the elimination of  its  rivals.  The confederation headquarters  was  aware of  the
enfeeblement of labor unions due to the new legal institutional context that the junta
administration  established  in  its  effort  to  transform  the  Turkish  economy  from  an
import-substituting to an export-led form of industrialization. The right to unionize and
strike  was  severely  restricted;  clauses  protecting  the  employers’  profitability  were
introduced,  and direct links between political  parties and labor unions were severed.
However,  the  higher  echelons  of  organized  labor  hoped  that  once  civilian  rule  was
restored, these excesses would be removed (Koç 1989: 95). They were mistaken.
24 The civilian government led by Turgut Özal did not seek to continue the populist politics
of  the  former  center-right  cabinets  towards  the  public  enterprise  labor  unions;  the
military rule might have ended, but the politics of economic liberalization still persisted.
The structural adjustments that the Turkish system went through did not permit social
considerations to be taken into account when formulating economic policies, and the new
government taught organized labor the basics of this new era the hard way. For instance,
a public employer body was set up to deal with the collective bargaining processes in the
public  sector,  thus  severing  the  patronage  link  between  labor  union  officials  and
politicians which previously constituted the basis of labor union activity (Yol-İş  1986:
85-89). Moreover, this body was registered to the Confederation of Turkish Employers’
Associations  [Türkiye  İşveren  Sendikaları  Konfederasyonu (TİSK)].  Petrol-İş,  one  of  the
biggest Türk-İş  affiliates and the leader of the social-democratic tendency within the
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confederation,  labeled  this  collaboration  a  class  front  of  “monopolist  capital”
“constituted by the government and TİSK” against the Turkish working class (Petrol-İş
1987: 7-9). This was not the usual discourse of a labor union organized in publicly owned
conglomerates.
25 Clearly the mood within the labor union circles soured. From early 1987 onwards, the
strikes gradually normalized, especially in the industrialized area of greater Istanbul, and
took the shape of  a minor and localized strike wave.3 The first  strikes took place in
private businesses situated around Istanbul, big metal or chemical factories with a history
of  labor  militancy,  such as  Netaş,  Derby  and Dora.  These  strikes  were  organized by
independent labor unions heir to the militant labor unions of the seventies. However,
when  Petrol-İş  went  on  strike  in sixty-three  factories,  most  of  which  were  private
businesses, the intensity of the labor unrest became clear. The Petrol-İş strike involved
approximately 20,000 workers, half of whom, the employees of strategic state economic
enterprises, did not legally have the right to strike (Petrol-İş 1987: 48, 72). Instead, the
latter undertook actions of solidarity,  such as silently marching before or after work
shifts,  boycotting  lunch,  or  spontaneously  leaving  work  and  going  to  the  company
infirmary together. Needless to say, these actions caused the police to intervene, since
some of  them amounted to illegal  strikes;  yet  the workers did not surrender.  In the
summer of 1987, the Zeytinburnu district of Istanbul became another hot spot of labor
unrest  when  Deri-İş  went  on  strike  in  leather  processing  businesses,  and  TÜMTİS
followed suit in Topkapı warehouses. Finally, when TezKop-İş started a strike in Migros
stores,  the  protest  movement  became  visible  even  in  the  wealthy  neighborhoods  of
Istanbul.
26 The  strikes  that  took  place  and  the  labor  unions  that  organized  them  had  some
distinguishable common features which allow us to include them under the common
umbrella of  a strike wave.  The majority of  these strikes,  which mobilized more than
twenty-five thousand workers, were organized in private businesses by the more radical
labor unions affiliated with Türk-İş. However, except for Petrol-İş, none of them were
influential  in  the  decision-making  mechanisms  of  the  confederation,  and  unlike  the
majority of the Türk-İş affiliates they were active in private businesses rather than state-
owned enterprises.  Obviously,  the case of Petrol-İş  stood alone, since it  is one of the
biggest labor unions in Turkey, the titular locomotive of the social-democratic opposition
in the confederation, and though it was also organized in private businesses, its power
base rested in the public sector.
27 The deteriorating economic conditions which constituted the ostensible motive for the
widespread labor unrest was not a novelty in 1987. Real wages had declined steadily since
1979  (Yeldan  2006:  44),  and  1987  did  not  witness  a  dramatic  worsening  of  these
conditions. However, the political agenda of this year was loaded, and that may have
played a part in the strike wave. The constitutional referendum of 1987 provided a focus
for public debate around the country’s rights and liberties regime. Organized labor was
among the main victims of the limitations imposed on basic political rights, and this was
vocally  criticized  by  the  leadership  of  the  labor  unions  from  early  1986  onwards.
Consequently, labor unions became natural advocates for any political coalition fighting
to widen the constricted margins of Turkish democracy. 
28 It must be noted that the 1987 strike wave, however local and politically limited, dispelled
the sense of hopelessness in labor union circles and proved the possibility of striking even
When Neoliberalism Confronts the Moral Economy of Workers: The Final Spring o...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 11 | 2010
8
under the existing laws. As a result, other strikes also took place, in factories such as the
State Ware’s Office and in the Seydişehir aluminum factory, a giant public enterprise
where Türk Metal went on strike for three months due to the low wage offers. General
complaints about the conditions of the laborers, aggravated by the unresponsiveness of
the government, were the main themes in these labor actions. When the news of the
strike in Seydişehir reached him, Özal threatened to shut down the factory, the only
producer of aluminum in Turkey, and to liberalize aluminum import. The leader of Türk
Metal, Mustafa Özbek, who was known for his docility vis-à-vis the employers and the
state,  reacted  furiously,  and  called  Özal  a  “strike  breaker”  and  “workers’  enemy”
(Sönmezsoy & Aslıyüce 1989: 279-284).
29 Such  anti-labor-union  discourse  was  not  exclusive  to  the  Özal  administration.
Conservative political movements in other countries have adopted similar strategies in
their pursuit of neoliberal transformation. Most famous among them is British prime
minister Margaret Thatcher, who, according to Stuart Hall,  deployed the discourse of
“nation” and “people” against the working class and labor unions with great vigor and
popular appeal. Hall argues that this discourse was a purposeful and intentional assault
“on the very foundation and raison d’être of organized labor” (Hall 1979: 17). He labels this
policy “authoritarian populism.”
30 Other students of British politics, including Bob Jessop, point to the divisive nature of
Thatcherist  politics.  They  consider  the  authoritarian  populism  argument  deficient
because it fails to capture the divisive nature of new conservatism, which they see as a
strategy to divide the country into, on the one hand, “welfare scavengers,” and on the
other,  members of  the middle class  with legitimate aspirations for embourgeoisment
(Jessop et al. 1984). In a country like England, where class-based political affiliations have
an  established  presence,  such  political  strategies  may  signify  a  new  phase  of  class
struggle. In Turkey, where the working class was constantly asked to make sacrifices for
the sake of national development, and where the national character of this class was
stressed in almost every related legal document, the Thatcherist rhetoric constituted an
attack on the moral economy of the Turkish workers, and involved a radical break from
the populist rhetoric of the political class.
31 The  most  publicized  labor  struggle  of  1988  took  place  in  SEKA,  a  monopolistic,
strategically important public enterprise located in Kocaeli and the only paper producer
in the country. Selüloz-İş, a Türk-İş affiliate whose membership was primarily from SEKA,
had never resorted to a  strike in that  establishment,  and previous governments had
generally preferred to protect its qualified workers. The Özal administration, on the other
hand, was resolved to maintain its fiscal austerity measures. That is why the negotiations
failed,  to the surprise of  the union officials,  who were expecting amelioration in the
wages and other social benefits, an expectation shared by the workers on the shop floor.
The public employer, mindful of the larger collective bargaining stage on the bulk of
public enterprises that was to take place in the spring of 1989, did not want the SEKA
agreement to exceed certain limits.
32 Under  the  leadership  of  the  Kocaeli  local  of  Selüloz-İş,  workers  concerned with  the
lengthening  bargaining  procedure  started  passive  protests  similar  to  those  realized
during the Petrol-İş  strikes of the prior year. The government was unimpressed with
these  protests,  and  made  no  concessions  to  the  labor  unions’  demands;  instead,  it
liberalized  paper  imports  immediately  and  declared  a  lockout.  The  lockout  shocked
Selüloz-İş, which faced pressure from the non-unionized staff of SEKA. In order to further
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discipline the workers,  a rumor concerning the relocation of  the Kocaeli  factory was
confirmed by the cabinet. Furthermore, ministers began to point to the low profitability
of the establishment. According to their view, wages could only be raised if SEKA’s profits
rose. This mentality, which placed profitability over the strategic importance of national
self-sufficiency in important products, was the hallmark of the Özal administration. For
public enterprise labor unionists like those in Selüloz-İş, who were raised in the context
of national developmentalism and state corporatism, these values were foreign. That is
why Nevzat Sözer, the general secretary of Selüloz-İş and a former SEKA worker himself,
blamed the government: “Those who are responsible for the first strike in SEKA’s 54-year
long history should be ashamed” (Tarih Vakfı 1998: 6). Sözer, in line with the prevalent
mentality among the typical Turkish public enterprise labor unionists, considered the
strike in a state-owned establishment an act to be ashamed of, though the real culprit was
the government, which blatantly violated the traditional code of industrial relations in
state economic enterprises.
 
IV. The Actions of Spring 1989
33 Considering these developments, it would not have been difficult to anticipate that 1989
would be a turbulent year, a repeat of 1987 on a larger scale, since it was the contract
renewal year for many public enterprises, a process which would coincide with municipal
elections during the first  half  of  the year.  Encouraged by the relative success of  the
preceding years, the labor unions pushed for a deal that would have stopped or even
reversed the decline of their members’ wages and other social benefits. Furthermore, this
time Türk-İş headquarters was able to secure the unity of its affiliates at the bargaining
table.  It  established a central  coordination responsible for negotiating with the body
representing public employers, and thus coordinated its opposition to the unified front of
the employers.
34 Agreement on the wages and other benefits for 600,000 public workers was blocked by
fundamental disagreements. The government did not yield to the demands of the labor
unions.  Fiscal  austerity  was  the  hallmark  of  the  Özal  administration,  and  unless  an
electoral defeat became imminent, it had little incentive to depart from this principle. On
the other side,  the unity among the affiliated labor unions was strengthened by the
already existing militancy at the shop floor level. The experience of the preceding years
had led to the creation of workplace organizations such as strike solidarity committees
and  committees  to  monitor  the  collective  bargaining  process  (Güntepe  1989).  These
informal organizations emerged as alternatives to outlawed control mechanisms such as
strikes  and solidarity strikes  to ensure the employers’  compliance with the terms of
existing  collective  contracts.  Furthermore,  some  labor  union  leaders  preferred
representative bodies at the grassroots level to collective bargaining in harsh economic
conditions  without  any  legal  leverage  over  the  employers.  The  existence  of  such
grassroots organizations thus expanded the unions’ organizational structure at the shop
floor level.
35 These grassroots organizations intervened in a bargaining process that seemed to be in a
deadlock,  and put  pressure  on the  government  through newly  popularized  forms  of
protest  such as lunch boycotts,  collectively calling in sick,  slowing down production,
refusing to shave, shaving off hair, delaying starts of work shifts, and organizing small
gatherings and marches before or after shifts. These passive forms of resistance, widely
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used in recent years to get around legal prohibitions by testing the boundaries of legality,
dominated the bargaining process during March and April 1989. They were in fact not
entirely new tools in the tool kit of labor protest.4 They had not been widely used in the
past simply because of the existence of more efficient and active legal ways of protesting.
When  they  occurred  in  1989,  however,  they  were  spontaneous,  widespread,  and
developed with the initiative of the local labor union activists (Pekin 1989). For instance,
in a widely publicized episode from Diyarbakır more than thousand members of Yol-İş
petitioned for divorce due to their inability to support their families. This action was
truly the first of its kind.
36 Türk-İş headquarters neither asked for nor sanctioned these actions, yet they formed a
formidable moment in a cycle of protest that had started at the end of 1986. Like the
Petrol-İş  members  who defied the ban on striking and supported their  comrades  by
organizing  frequent  actions  of  passive  disobedience  during  the  collective  bargaining
process  of  1987,  and  the  workers  at  Kocaeli  SEKA  factory  right  before  the  strike,
thousands of public enterprise workers organized spontaneous acts of protest in almost
every province of the country. While it is impossible to gauge their precise impact on the
negotiations, such actions undoubtedly took part in setting the agenda of the municipal
elections, and thus contributed to the governing party’s absolute defeat and the eventual
agreement between Türk-İş and the government in May. Despite their passive nature,
these  protests  also  voiced  established  political  demands  of  organized  labor,  such  as
amendments  to  the  existing  laws  concerning  unionization  rights  and  the  collective
bargaining regime (Çelik 1996). Moreover, encouraged by the rising labor militancy in the
public  sector,  many  strikes  followed  in  the  leather  processing,  metal  and  chemical
industries, most of which continued into 1990.
37 Türk-İş headquarters rapidly moved in and supported these local initiatives in order to
use them to its advantage in the stalled negotiations. Unlike some of its conservative
affiliates,  the  confederation  never  hesitated  to  show  solidarity  with  its  members,
especially after the municipal elections, which shook the daily routine of the cities every
day until the government gave in. The April 1989 issue of the official gazette of Türk-İş is
full of articles openly embracing the movements in the street, and a declaration of its
presidential  council  addressed the over-confident  government,  demanding immediate
resolution of the negotiations. Türk-İş sounded like they were among the victors of the
municipal elections.
38 The municipal elections held in March were an utter defeat for Özal’s ANAP government,
and  a  promising  victory  for  its  main  opponent,  the  left-of-center  Social-Democratic
Populist Party [Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti(SHP)]. The urban wage earners seem to have
voted for SHP, since it did especially well in the largest industrial cities such as Istanbul,
Ankara,  Izmir,  Adana,  Gaziantep  and Kocaeli,  where  the  co-occurrence  of  electoral
campaigning with widespread labor unrest and protests had produced a political climate
largely in favor of labor politics. In addition, the dismal result of ANAP encouraged the
workers and facilitated their efforts to obtain an advantageous offer from the official
body of public employers. Consequently, an agreement was reached in mid-May between
a  triumphant  Şevket  Yılmaz,  the  chairman of  Türk-İş,  and  a  governing  party  losing
ground to its  opponents.  The raise that Türk-İş  received brought an increase in real
wages for the first time after a decade of decline.
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39 The spring actions marked the first of two climaxes in the cycle of protest that began at
the end of 1986 and continued until the last months of 1991. The sheer number of workers
involved in the spontaneous movement can only be compared to such historical incidents
in Turkish labor history as the strike wave of 1908, the unionization thrust in 1946, and
the uprising on 15-16 June 1970. Thanks to the spread of the state economic enterprises
throughout Anatolia, almost every important city witnessed some form of action. The
1987  strike  wave  is  also  important  because  of  its  pioneering  nature.  Despite  the
authoritarian measures still in force and the general mood of submissiveness inherited
from three years of  military rule,  especially among the ranks of  the organized labor
movement, these bold attempts by independent labor unions and Türk-İş affiliates broke
the  silence.  The  1989  spring,  on  the  other  hand,  revealed  the  anger  of  the  public
enterprise workers at being cast out of the political sphere. The accumulated experience
of the last two years showed that it was possible to enter the domain of politics using
more direct means, which appeared more feasible after the traditional links of dialogue
had been severed by the Özal administration. One must acknowledge the passive nature
of the protest methods used by the demonstrators, but what appear to be passive actions
were  in  fact  invented  by  the  more  radical  segments  of  the  Turkish  organized  labor
movement in order to bypass the crippling stipulations of the industrial relations regime
during the previous years, and when used by thousands of workers on a daily basis they
became  radical.  Under  a  political  regime  where  every  gathering,  even  scientific
conferences, had to obtain authorization from the provincial authorities, “radical” may
even be an insufficient adjective to describe the extent to which seemingly passive acts
such  as  marching  to  workplaces  instead  of  taking  service  buses  or  calling  in  sick
collectively challenged the status quo. 
40 The  enterprise  workers’  participation  in  these  acts  of  civil  disobedience  was  not
“spasmodic,” to borrow the term from E. P. Thompson. They were not taking the risk of
being fired or jailed because they were undernourished or deprived of the means of a
decent livelihood. The transgression was not simply against their stomachs, but against
the moral economy underpinning their way of making a living. That is why the most
crowded demonstrations took place when the labor unions supported such actions and
when the main motto of the protest was against the prime minister himself. Their main
target was the prime minister, who denounced their labor unions at every opportunity,
and wanted to sell off - or worse, close - their work places, openly declaring his allegiance
to the employers.
41 The consequences of the 1989 spring were manifold. First of all, the deal between the
government and Türk-İş ended a decade of permanent decreases in real wages. On the
one hand, this must have emboldened the workers in their struggle; on the other hand, it
eased the tension, especially among the public enterprise workers. Secondly, the protests
of  1989  contributed  to  the  first  electoral  victory  of  the  left  since  1977.  1989  also
contributed to reducing the harshness of the security forces vis-à-vis public gatherings.
From the summer of 1989 onwards the labor unions organized open-air demonstrations
far more frequently than they had earlier that decade. The workers in the private sector
also participated in these demonstrations by organizing solidarity visits or even marches.
The strike activity also rose among the private businesses. However, after the signing of
the lucrative agreement between Türk-İş and the government, many of the workers who
had led these protests were sanctioned by disciplinary investigations and some of them
lost  their  jobs  (Oğuz  1995:  50).  In  most  cases  labor  union  officials  refrained  from
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protecting these younger grassroots leaders for fear of electoral competition within the
unions; in other instances these leaders rose to become officials in various union posts. As
expected,  the  layoffs  were  more frequent  in  private  businesses.  Approximately  6,000
workers were fired during May and June of 1989 in the chemical industry alone. The
reports showed that most of these firings were related to the protest movement. In any
case, labor union leadership was transformed as a result of the 1989 spring, especially at
the local level, though the higher echelons withstood the onslaught, particularly in bigger
labor unions. Those who rose to prominence in these actions were eliminated within a
few years, yet in the smaller affiliates of Türk-İş, a new leadership took hold, mostly in
close collaboration with left-wing groups.
 
V. The Great Miners’ March and the Retreat of the
Movement
42 One of the most illustrative episodes, and the second peak moment in the whole cycle of
protest, is the great march of Zonguldak miners to the capital. This experience not only
constitutes  a  model  case  of  the  grievances  and  frustration  of  the  public  enterprise
workers, but also involves a movement of historical significance. The Zonguldak basin is
the foremost coal mining center of the country, yet it never witnessed large-scale labor
unrest  or  even long-lasting strikes.  Unlike their  counterparts  in other countries,  the
history of Zonguldak miners is devoid of major strikes and demonstrations, apart from
the some rare and spontaneous resistance movements. The coal fields in this area were
operated  from  the  mid-nineteenth  century  onwards,  by  foreign  capital  during  the
Ottoman era and by a state monopoly during the Republican era. The first examples of
social  policy  legislation  concerning  the  Zonguldak  coal  field  dates  back  to  the  late
Ottoman era. Nonetheless, the province has always been geographically and politically
isolated from the rest  of  the country (Roy 1976).  Despite the traditional  tendency of
Turkish labor unions to unite in nationally integrated organizations, Zonguldak miners
retained their own labor unions even after the junta passed the Labor Unions Law to
promote national unification. All in all, the Turkish Coal Association [Türkiye Taşkömürü
Kurumu (TTK)] is a quintessential state economic enterprise and its employees are typical
public enterprise workers.
43 From the mid-1980s onwards the Zonguldak mines became the focal point in the debate
concerning  the  privatization  policies  of  the  regime.  The  legal  foundations  of  the
privatization  program  were  established  in  1984.  Turgut  Özal  never  concealed  his
intentions  concerning  the  state  economic  enterprises.  During  his  tenure,  the  public
enterprises started to lose their roles as industrial leaders due to the lack of new financial
resources (Öniş 1991). Their levels of employment were either frozen or reduced, though
their  shares  in  sales  and  profitability  did  not  decline  because  of  the  frequent  price
adjustments and the public enterprise reform that began with the economic package on
24 January (Waterbury 1992: 136-139).
44 The prime minister, along with his brother, who was the undersecretary of the State
Planning Organization, as well as famous industrialists like İshak Alaton, all cited the
Zonguldak mines as the primary example of the inefficiency of the public enterprises,
claiming that importing coal would be cheaper and more cost-efficient. During his final
days as prime minister, Turgut Özal described the Zonguldak mines as a hindrance for the
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state. According to hum, these institutions operated with higher costs compared to the
international standards; hence it was better to shut them down than to renovate them.
The major claim of such critics was thus that the coal basin did not operate according to
the  principles  of  market  rationality.  Indeed,  the  Turkish  coal  industry  had  been
established on the basis of a different rationale, one based on strategic concerns and the
aims of national development. The miners and the populace of Zonguldak were not used
to other industrial principles;  they had no reason to regard them as relevant for the
mines.
45 Furthermore, the demands for higher wages by the labor unions that represented these
inefficient institutions were described by Özal as illegitimate. He made plain his stance on
these issues when he declared that the state would no longer be a father figure. The
newspaper reports show that the miners and general populace of Zonguldak were greatly
disturbed by such remarks; their concern was aggravated when the government sold off
the mining rights for certain fringe coal veins to private entrepreneurs. It seems that
these worries reflected themselves in changes in the Zonguldak Miners’ labor union [
Genel Maden İşçileri Sendikası (GMİS)] leadership after 1986.
46 GMİS was a typical Türk-İş affiliate prior to 1986, with union bosses who occupied the
same  posts  for  years,  were  heavily  involved  in  local  politics  through  establishment
parties, and were used to lobby in Ankara to obtain pay raises and other benefits. At the
end of 1986 a new generation of miners was elected to the headquarters of GMİS, which
unlike many other Türk-İş labor unions was not located in Ankara but in Zonguldak. The
last remnants of the old cadre were swept away in the 1989 congress. A further drive
behind this rejuvenation was the unexpectedly negative contract that the old leadership
signed during the previous collective bargaining phase. The old leadership’s reliance on
its connections in Ankara had proven fruitless as the miners’ income deteriorated and the
TTK lagged behind in technology due to the government’s negligence. In addition to these
deteriorating  conditions  came  the  bombardment  of  hostile  press  releases  from  the
authorities. TTK was operating at a loss and was technologically backward, so the union’s
demands for pay raises were seen as illegitimate. The miners, though, were well aware
that it was the government that prevented investment in the coal basin and that wanted
to divest  the mines to private businesses.  They also blamed the government for  the
decline in their purchasing power and the woes of their province. Anger and frustration
was brewing in Zonguldak.
47 GMİS organized a large demonstration Zonguldak on 24 February 1990 in order to protest
an accident that killed sixty-nine miners in the Yeniçeltek lignite mines. Türk-İş declared
a  day  of  mourning  on  the  same  day,  but  refrained  from  organizing  an  open-air
demonstration in an industrial center to condemn industrial accidents that were claiming
the lives of hundreds of workers every year. GMİS, for the first time, was ahead of the
confederation. This unusual meeting, accompanied by a two-hour work stoppage, was a
sign of the changing mood of Zonguldak miners, who were previously known for their
submissiveness. Moreover, the newly elected union administration went into the mines
and  discussed  the  terms  of  the  contract  with  the  miners,  thus  adding  them to  the
negotiation process, another novelty for the coal basin.
48 The public  employer  seemed to force the labor  union to  strike by refusing to  make
monetary  offers  during  much  of  the  negotiations  concerning  the  Institute  of  Mine
Exploration. This attitude was also perceived as proof of the employer’s intention to close
down the mines. The inhabitants of Zonguldak, whose economy was highly dependent on
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the mines, watched the bargaining process closely. The miners themselves were involved
in  the  process  through  the  committees  that  had  been  established  thanks  to  the
supportive  approach  of  the  new  GMİS  headquarters.  These  committees  played  an
important part in the following events. After rumors began circulating that the mines
would be closed, the workers, who would normally have demanded wages and benefits,
began to demand democracy, in the sense of having a say over the political decisions
related to their own futures.5 The protest was not restricted to the miners; the entire
populace of Zonguldak depended on the mines and wanted its voice heard on a matter so
crucial to their livelihood.
49 As expected, the negotiations collapsed and 42,000 miners went on strike on the last day
of November 1990. The uncompromising attitude of the employer strengthened fears that
the coal mines would be closed. December of 1990 passed, while the rhetoric about the
inefficiency and financial losses of the coal industry intensified, and the grip of the labor
union over Zonguldak tightened. Through strike committees the climate of resistance
spread everywhere  in  the  province.  Türk-İş  headquarters  intervened in  the  dealings
because of the symbolic character of the crisis. As long as the question of shutting down
the coal mines was still  on the table, the labor unrest would not calm down, yet the
government, pressured by President Özal, did not yield. The confederation thus decided
to flex its muscles, and declared a day of action. This day of action was to be, in effect, a
general strike. Şevket Yılmaz declared that he would not go to work on 3 January 1991,
and expected the membership of Türk-İş  to do the same. The participation surpassed
expectations, especially in southeastern Turkey, yet the real significance of the action lies
in the fact that Türk-İş resorted to such a radical measure. 
50 The government was not impressed by the confederation’s decision to call for a general
action, so the negotiations continued to stall the following day. Meanwhile, the miners
gathered in Zonguldak city center and waited for the decision of GMİS headquarters.
From the beginning of the strike, the miners had threatened to march to Ankara, a great
march which would finalize  the contract  for  good.  Indeed,  GMİS planned to  carry a
number of miners to Ankara with buses to further pressure the government to reach a
deal. When the buses were not allowed into the city, Şemsi Denizer, the relatively young
chairman of GMİS, invited the miners to march to Ankara on foot (Karakaş 1992). When
he and the other officers of GMİS began marching, thousands, including women, followed
them without the necessary logistics of a winter march.
51 The sight of ordinary people marching in the winter in the middle of nowhere while
chanting slogans against the government was impressive and inspiring to say the least.
The  procession  reached Devrek6 at  nighttime where  the  local  populace  received  the
marchers extremely well; the next day they reached Mengen7 and the lack of logistics
began to take a toll. However, the marchers were stubborn and continued for the third
day  while  the  government  offered  to  renegotiate  the  terms  of  the  contract  on  the
condition that they would end the march. The parade arrived a few kilometers away from
the  main highway connecting  Istanbul  to  Ankara  before  it  was  halted  by  a  military
barricade. The miners camped in front of the fortification for the night. The stalemate
was  resolved  the  next  day  when  the  prime  minister,  Yıldırım  Akbulut,  a  mild  and
traditional politician, disobeyed Turgut Özal and gave his word to Şemsi Denizer that the
terms of the agreement would be renegotiated.
52 After the miners returned to Zonguldak, the GMİS leadership in Ankara was humiliated,
and  had  to  sign  a  contract  that  did  not  match  the  historical  importance  of  their
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movement.  Türk-İş  headquarters,  which refrained from organizing active  protests  in
other cities while the miners marched, did not stand by GMİS during this process. This
was understandable, since the prime minister’s more lenient attitude showed that the
imminent threat against the miners’ way of living, and hence of the public enterprise
workers in general,  was beginning to dissolve.  However,  the militancy of  the miners
exposed another threat to the established order of the labor unions. The bigger affiliates
of  Türk-İş  mostly  active  in  public  enterprises  refrained  from organizing  widespread
solidarity  campaigns  for  the  Zonguldak  miners  since  they  had  achieved  beneficial
contracts in 1989, and the crusade against public enterprises lost its zeal after ANAP’s
electoral  defeats.  In  short,  with  the  Özal  administration’s  threat  of  privatization
seemingly alleviated, other labor unions lacked the motivation to support the miners.
53 The vociferous protest movement of 1989 did not intend to revolutionize the regime of
industrial relations, but rather to restore its old basis. That is why there was only limited
external support of the miners’ march, which threatened to greatly disturb the political
status quo of the country. In 1991 the violator of the moral economy was visibly on the
decline,  and  it  would  lose  the  general  elections  a  few  months  later.  Large-scale
privatizations  were  either  postponed  or  extended.  In  these  circumstances,  the
establishments of the organized labor movement did not feel the grassroots pressure to
intervene directly, hence the activity of the unions receded. This meant, in a sense, the
beginning of the retreat of the cycle of protest that had begun in late 1986. Especially
during the negotiations of 1991, this retreat became visible just before the ultimate defeat
of ANAP in the October 1991 general elections.
54 1991 marked the end of the cycle of protest instigated by organized labor as a reaction to
the neoliberal transformation that threatened the moral economy of the Turkish public
enterprise  workers  who  constituted  the  backbone  of  the  national  labor  unions.  The
decline made itself clear in the collective bargaining process of 1991, where a repetition
of  the  protests  of  1989  was  staged,  yet  this  time  in  an  institutional  manner.  The
spontaneity, creativity, and testing of the limits of the legal system were absent. The
principal characteristic of the 1989 spring was the breaking of the routine, yet now these
passive forms of action were normalized as auxiliary rituals of the collective bargaining
process.
55 Throughout the negotiations, Türk-İş headquarters kept the initiative and control over
the movement. The content of the slogans was more political in 1991 than in to 1989. This
is  understandable  since  everyone  expected  early  general  elections,  and catchphrases
ridiculing Özal were pervasive. For the bulk and the mainstream of the organized labor
movement that instigated the popular labor protests after 1986, the target was clearly the
transgression of the moral economy. The symbol of this transgression was Özal and his
party, whose demise was imminent, not the existing relations of production. In 1991,
while  the  radical  phase  and  upbeat  pace  of  the  neoliberal  transformation  process
receded, so did its opponent, in the guise of the traditional labor union centers and their
membership.
 
Concluding Remarks
56 The reaction against the post-1980 political and economic transformations that aimed to
install market rationality based on profit-maximizing behavior as the essential principle
in the management of the public economy was mainly defensive in its objectives. Indeed,
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as already cited, labor unrest triggered because of a perceived violation of the moral
economy  of  industrial  relations  almost  always  has  a  “restorative”  disposition.  Its
restorative  nature  means  that  organized  labor  does  not  necessarily  promote an
alternative political agenda for the country; instead, it aims to shield the obvious victims
of  this  transformation,  unionized  labor  in  general  and  employees  of  the  public
enterprises in particular, from the consequences of the transformations. The trajectory of
development that the Turkish labor movement went through historically involved the
higher echelons of  Türk-İş  intervening to quell  the protests when they breached the
limits of  acceptable political  criticism. A protest movement based on the more lively
sectors of the working class opposition, on the other hand, tended to force these limits. If
the authorities augmented the political pressures on the opposition, the movement would
either give in or radicalize under the rising influence of the politically motivated fringe.
However, if the demands were somehow accommodated, the consequence would be the
decline of the movement coupled with the emergence of a new balance of forces. The
nature of the movement’s demands is also an intervening factor: if these were restorative
rather than change-oriented, the constitution of a compromise might be reached easier
by temporary concessions that did not hurt the basic rationale of the transformation
which was under way.  This model may summarize the fate of  the protest movement
instigated by the workers when the Özal administration violated the moral economy of
the Turkish organized labor.
57 Today the turbulent  five  years  spanning from 1986 to  1991 are  forgotten.  The main
reason is the movement’s restorative nature and lack of an alternative political agenda.
The  spring  of  1989  and the  Great  Miners’  March are  historical  moments  of  a  social
movement that protested the neoliberal assault on the unionized workers’ way of living
and broke their daily routines, yet the the movement’s lack of a longer-term agenda made
them out of  touch with the direction of  the social  change.  Furthermore,  the Pyrrhic
victories which the confederation obtained at the bargaining table with the government
protected the workers individually, but also allowed the suppression of their livelihood
and nascent culture. That is the very reason why Edward Thompson once remarked it is
up to the student of the social history to rescue the meaning of their struggle “from the
enormous condescension of posterity.”
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NOTES
1. Although Buğra’s attempt to reduce Thompson’s moral economy argument and Polanyi’s great
transformation thesis to their least common denominator impoverishes the theoretical subtlety
of Thompson’s argumentation somewhat, it none the less captures the point about the ultimately
unsustainable nature of sticking to old forms of paternalism when confronted by new economic
and social circumstances.
2.  The details of the strikes and other forms of labor resistance cited in this and the following
sections are based on the reviews of two monthly newspapers unless otherwise specified. These
newspapers are Yeni Çözüm (issues 2-8; 19-31) and İşçilerin Sesi (issues 1-35).
3.  Charles Tilly notes that “Strikes differ emphatically from cumulative social phenomena such
as  births,  school  attendance  and  traffic  attendance  since  they  veer  rapidly  in  location  and
number from one period to the next. Indeed strikes arrive in great waves that wash over an
entire region or country” (Tilly 2002: 433). The developments of 1987 comply with this pattern.
4.  The barefoot marches of the municipality workers from the sixties constitute early examples
in this respect.
5.  This remark was made by Çetin Uygur, the ex-chairman of Yeraltı  Maden-İş  and then Dev
Maden-Sen, during a personal interview in İstanbul, in 17 May 2009.
6.  Devrek is an inland county approximately fifty kilometers south of Zonguldak on the road to
Ankara.
7.  Mengen is an inland county approximately eighty kilometers south of Zonguldak on the road
to Ankara.
ABSTRACTS
The 1980s transformed the social and economic outlook of Turkey. This transformation led by
the Motherland Party is comparable to the wider global trend of neoliberal transformation. The
structural changes necessitated or triggered by this transformation attacked existing modes of
social and political relationships, including the moral economy of Turkish unionized workers.
The reaction against this assault created a cycle of protest led by the organized labor spanning
from the end of 1986 to the fall  of 1991. This protest movement contributed to the electoral
defeats suffered by the Motherland Party in 1989 and in 1991. This movement emerged despite
repressive legal measures still in force after the military intervention of 1980, and constitutes the
last massive showing by the trade unions. This paper analyzes the specifics of the development
and the retreat of this social movement.
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